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There are some thirty million internally displaced persons (IDPs)
today as compared to fifteen million refugees. The root causes generating
refugees and IDPs are essentially the same: armed conflicts and human
rights abuses. While refugees are protected by a number of international
treaties and organizations, and are enjoying comparative safety in countries
of asylum or resettlement, IDPs are not - supposedly on the ground that
since IDPs are within their own country, their government should be
responsible for their protection. This ignores the fact that their own
government often is the source of their persecution or is unwilling or
unable to provide them with protection. Consequently, IDPs on the whole
suffer more than refugees. Little effort, however, has been made to fill
the gap in the protection of IDPs by the United Nations and international
lawyers. With respect to the United Nations, on the recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary-General in 1992 appointed
Dr. Francis Dent of the Sudan as his representative on IDPs, but with very
little budgetary or staff support. The United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) has extended its protective arms to IDPs on an ad hoc
basis at the request of the General Assembly. The International Law
Commission or the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the General Assembly has
not seen fit to codify or progressively develop the legal status of IDPs.
At the non-governmental level, the International Law Association
(ILA) established in November 1992 an International Committee on IDPs,
with Professors Rainer Hofmann of Germany and Yukio Shimada of Japan
as co-Rapporteurs, and myself as Chairman. The Committee is drafting a
Declaration of Principles of International Law on IDPs for adoption by the
* Special Adviser, Population, Refugees and Migration, Department of State. The views
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ILA in 1998. At its conference in Helsinki last August, the ILA
provisionally adopted a Draft Declaration and is requesting comments
from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, as well
as from UNHCR, United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), and relevant regional and non-governmental organizations.
The Committee would also welcome- your comments and would send you
copies of the text of the Draft Declaration upon request. I would like to
discuss my topic under three headings: protection of IDPs by governments
and de facto authorities, protection of IDPs as refugees, and protection of
humanitarian personnel.
I. PROTECTION OF IDPS BY GOVERNMENTS AND DE FACTO
AUTHORITIES
The term internally displaced persons may be defined as "persons
or groups of persons who have been forced to leave or flee their homes or
places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflict, internal strife,
systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters,
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."'
Recognizing the indispensable role of de facto authorities in the
protection of IDPs, the Draft Declaration singles out such authorities for
special emphasis and defines them as "any non-State entities in actual
control of parts of a State's territory which are parties to an armed conflict
and/or internal strife or have generated or hosted internally displaced
persons. "2
We proceed from the premise that a foremost responsibility of a
government is to provide protection to its nationals. As defined by Vattel,
nationality is "the bond which ties a state to each of its members." In the
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railways case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice observed: "[I]n the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond
of nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers
upon the State the right of diplomatic protection."
If, during an internal armed conflict, a government is unable to
provide protection to its citizens in an area from which it is driven away,
the de facto authorities must assume the responsibility. Indeed, their
ability to succeed to the de jure government hinges on their fulfillment of
such responsibility. Thus, under the Draft Declaration, de facto
1. Draft Declaration, art. 1(1).
2. Draft Declaration, art. 1(1).
[Vol. 3:529
1997]
authorities have the obligation to adopt all necessary measures to ensure
that IDPs have free and safe access to assistance and protection by relief
organizations (article 9); to take joint and separate action with states and to
cooperate with the United Nations and other international organizations,
both governmental and non-governmental, to promote respect for and
safeguard the rights and interests of IDPs (article 3); to renounce the use of
starvation as a weapon against IDPs during armed conflicts (article 16); and
to address the root causes of internal displacement with a view to adopting
preventive measures and obtaining durable solutions (article 11).
The aspirations of de facto authorities to succeed to the de jure
government and be recognized as such, as well as to gain membership in
the United Nations, provide a strong incentive for their compliance with
the Draft Declaration's provisions, especially if coupled with sanctions in
the event of noncompliance.
IL PROTECTION OF IDPs AS REFUGEES
The question may be raised as to whether the legal status of IDPs
may be analogized to that of refugees. An affirmative answer would
entitle IDPs to international protection as refugees, mutatis mutandis. An
analysis of their legal relationship follows.
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, all
retain crossing of national borders as sine quo non for the definition of
refugee. Thus, if persecuted individuals cross their national borders, an
elaborate system of international law and institutions comes into play for
their protection. However, if they remain within the national border, they
are not considered refugees, hence not entitled to such protection. But the
use of border crossing as the most important criterion for distinguishing
between refugees and IDPs, hence determining their eligibility to
international protection, may be faulted on historical, practical, juridical,
and human rights grounds. Each of these grounds will be briefly
discussed. Historically, the phenomenon of refugee has existed since time
immemorial; some would date it to the proverbial expulsion of Adam and
Eve from the Garden of Eden. And yet territorial boundaries assumed
importance only after 1648 with the establishment of the Peace of
Westphalia that set the stage for the modem nation-state system. Indeed,
until the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, there had
never been any agreement defining refugee as a person who must be
outside his country. Under the May 12, 1926 arrangement, for example, a
Russian refugee was defined as "[a]ny person of Russian origin who does
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not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and who has not acquired another
nationality."
Similar definitions were adopted in the June 30, 1928
arrangement, the 1933 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and
others mutatis mutandis. The decisive criterion was the presence or lack
of protection by the governments concerned.
Even during the early years of the United Nations, the term
refugee included also the meaning of IDPs. Under the International
Refugee Organization of 1946, un-resettled persons of Jewish origin or
foreigners or stateless persons who had resided in Germany or Austria,
who were victims of Nazi persecution, and who were detained in Germany
or Austria, were also defined as refugees even if they had never left
Germany or Austria.
During the Korean War, the United Nations did not differentiate
between refugees and internally displaced persons in United Nations
documents. The United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has treated many IDPs as Palestine
refugees. Even during the early 1980s, the United Nations Group of
Governmentaf Experts on international Cooperation to Avert New Flows
of Refugees, of which I was a member, did not adhere to any refugee
definition using border crossing as a criterion.
Why, then, do the 1950 Statute of the UNHCR and the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees give great emphasis to
border crossing as a prerequisite to the refugee status?
It is necessary to place the 1951 Convention in perspective:
namely, it was adopted against the backdrop of a deepening Cold War.
Originally and essentially a European regional instrument until the
adoption of the 1967 Protocol, the 1951 Convention perforce mirrored the
political realities then in Europe, where the crossing of the Iron Curtain
was considered to be of critical importance and where political control
within Communist countries was so tight as to leave no room for conflicts
that might produce IDPs.
With the disappearance of the Soviet Upon as a superpower and
communism as a dominant ideology, the political persecution of
individuals by government has been largely replaced by human rights
abuses, ethnic conflicts, and generalized violence. Under these situations,
border crossing should no longer be made a prerequisite to the attainment
of the refugee status. The impracticality of using boundaries to distinguish
refugees from IDPs was highlighted by John Bolton, former Assistant
Secretary for International Organization, who accompanied former
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Secretary of State James Baker to the Iraqi-Turkish border near Tchivergia
in April 1991 as follows:
We saw very dramatic evidence of the plight of the refugees and
displaced. The Turkish military very kindly took us up to the border right
at the border so we could look out on this hard to describe scene of
thousands and thousands of people just sitting on the sides of the hills, and
in the valley; no shelter, no sanitation, no food distribution, nothing just
people who had come and were sitting there. A very dramatic sight, it had
a profound effect on the Secretary and in my view led directly to our
decision to launch "Operation Provide Comfort." But, just as an example,
we were to go up to the border and it was in a very hilly area. The
Secretary was there and our Defense Attach6 from Ankara came up to me
and said: 'I don't know how quite to say this, but we and the Secretary
are about ten yards inside Iraq.' It was a telling example that they did not
have bright yellow line painted in the sand or in the dirt between Iraq and
Turkey at that point, and the people on one side of the line were in exactly
the same condition as the people on the other side of the line. They both
needed protection and they both needed assistance.
Similarly, in my travel to the Ethiopian-Somali border as a
member of a Multi Donor Technical Mission in February 1991, I was
struck by the irrelevance of boundaries to nomads who fled ethnic conflicts
or civil strife crisscrossing the border. Since these nomads shared the
same ethnicity or nationality, religion, custom, language, or dialect, were
they Somali or Ethiopian refugees? Were they IDPs or returnees? Or a
mixture of the above? What difference would it make anyway, so long as
they needed the same kind of assistance and protection? Indeed, the Multi-
Donor Technical Mission rightly decided to base its recommendations for
their assistance not on their legal status, but rather on their needs.
A formidable juridical argument against the use of boundaries as
determinant of the refugee status is the fact that the validity of a boundary
is inextricably linked to the diplomatic recognition of the state concerned.
And yet there is no rule mandating a uniform diplomatic recognition of a
particular state. Thus, a country or a party to a civil war may be
recognized by some states, but not by others. Cases in point are Biafra
during the late 1960s, former North and South Vietnam, former East and
West Germany, North and South Korea, and now the fragmentation of the
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In each case, a displaced person
may be considered a refugee and IDP simultaneously by different states,
depending on the recognition factor. Such dual status cannot but blur the
boundary between the two.
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Indeed, the domestic laws of some countries already recognize that
refugees need not be outside their country. The Refugee Act of 1980, for
example, defines refugee to mean, inter alia:
In such special circumstances as the President after
appropriate consultation . . may specify, any person who
is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, within the country
in which such person is habitually residing, and who is
persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.'
This provision has provided the basis for the Orderly Departure
Program (ODP) administered by UNHCR, under which refugees have
been airlifted from Ho Chi Minh City to Bangkok for onward journey to
resettlement countries. It has also formed the basis for in-country
processing of asylum seekers in Russia, Cuba, and Haiti. In view of the
involvement of UNHCR in the ODP, all of its members may arguably be
presumed to have accepted the fact that refugees need not by definition be
physically outside the countries of origin.
But the strongest argument against the use of border crossing to
justify preferential treatment of refugees over IDPs is its incompatibility
with equal protection under human rights defined by the late Sir Humphrey
Waldock, former President of the International Court of Justice, as "rights
which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their nationality," and,
I would add, wherever they may be. To the extent that their basic human
rights have been violated, they are entitled to protection and assistance
whether as refugees abroad or as IDPs within their own country. Equal
rights for all individuals, be they aliens or nationals, refugees or IDPs, is
implied in all universal and regional United Nations human rights
instruments through the use of such expressions as all human beings,
everyone, no one, or all. Not a single right in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, for example, is specified or implied as belonging only to
refugees, and not IDPs. Thus, in the words of the present United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees: "It made little sense for UNHCR to
bring relief and protection to one group of suffering people, i.e. refugees
under the 1951 Convention, and to disregard the misery of the other
afflicted people."
She therefore proposed international relief and protection based on
needs rather than on the categories into which people are classified.
3. The Refugees Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(42) 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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But can equal protection of refugees and IDPs be translated from
theory into practice? The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) has shown that this can be done. And the Security Council, in
Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, mandates "that Iraq allow immediate
access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of
assistance in all parts of Iraq," in addition to requesting the Secretary-
General "to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and
displaced Iraqi population."
The foregoing analysis shows that basing international protection
of refugees and IDPs on border crossing is untenable on historical,
practical, juridical, and human rights grounds. Border crossing should no
longer be the criterion for conferring or withholding international
protection. Both refugees and IDPs are entitled to international protection.
There are, to be sure, procedural differences between the
implementation of international protection of refugees and that of IDPs.
However, such differences should not be allowed to obscure the
substantive similarities. How to harmonize the two poses a serious
challenge to international lawyers.
III. PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL
It is truism to state that humanitarian services and supplies cannot
be effectively delivered abroad without the active involvement of
humanitarian personnel, both expatriates and local employees, whose
safety must be ensured. While, in the event of an armed attack or a threat
thereof, expatriates can be withdrawn to safety in their home base or
country relatively easily in view of their small numbers, local employees
and their families, however, present a more difficult problem. The current
-debate over the evacuation of local employees of American relief agencies
and their families from northern Iraq to Turkey and thence to Guam and
the United States for resettlement is a case in point. Might not such
evacuation and resettlement have a deterrent effect on future humanitarian
effort?
One possible solution lies in linking all humanitarian efforts vis-A-
vis IDPs to the United Nations or one of its agencies, as well as in
promoting the widest possible adherence to the United Nations Convention
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, signed
December 9, 1994. The Convention defines associated personnel as, inter
alia, persons deployed by a government, intergovernmental organization
or "a humanitarian non-governmental organization or agency under an
agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations or with a
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specialized agency .. to carry out activities in support of the fulfillment
of the mandate of a United Nations operation"4
4. (Art. l(b)(ii)).
